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Duress, Demanding Heroism, and
Proportionality
Luis E. Chiesa*

ABSTRACT

This Article discusses the Erdemovic case in order to
examine whether duress should be a defense to a crime against
humanity. Although the Article contends that the arguments in
favor of permitting the defendant to claim duress weaken as the
seriousness of the offense charged increases, the Article also
argues that the duress defense should usually succeed if it can
be proved that the actor could not have prevented the threatened
harm by refusing to capitulate to the coercion.
After balancing the competing considerations, the Author
concludes that the defendant in Erdemovic should have been
able to claim duress as a defense to the killing of dozens of
civilians. Because the civilians would have died anyway at the
hands of other soldiers, resisting the threats would have been
useless. Even though this fact does not negate the wrongfulness
of the defendant's act (i.e., justify his conduct), it should exempt
him from responsibility (i.e., excuse his liability).
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CASE THAT PROBES THE THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE

DEFENSE OF DURESS: PROSECUTOR V. DRAZEN ERDEMOvIC

Prosecutorv. Erdemovic presents a particularly difficult case for
the defense of duress. In Erdemovic, the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) tried the soldier Drazen
Erdemovic for crimes against humanity.
He was charged with
systematically killing Muslim men and children in July 1995 as a

1.
Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Judgment on Appeal,
(Oct. 7, 1997).

10
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member of the Bosnian Serb army. 2 Initially, he refused to take part
in the shootings, but his superiors threatened to kill him if he did not
comply.3 At trial, Erdemovic confessed that he succumbed to the
threats and killed nearly seventy people. 4 Ultimately, the question
before the ICTY Appeals Chamber was whether the defense of duress
5
is available when the offense charged is a crime against humanity.
After struggling to come to grips with the problem, a majority of
the justices in the ICTY concluded that, according to customary
international law, duress is not a defense to murder.6 In contrast, the
dissenters believed that duress could, in principle, exclude
responsibility for the killing of innocent human beings; however, they
concluded that the defense of duress is subject to strict
proportionality requirements. 7
Thus, the dissenters ultimately
concluded that, in light of the grave harm caused when crimes
against humanity are committed, it would be nearly impossible to
establish the requisite proportionality between the harm effected and
8
the harm averted.
The question before the ICTY in Erdemovic was a momentous
one. Determining whether duress should be a defense to a crime
against humanity requires delving deeply into the distinction
between justification and excuse in order to address three
foundational problems that cut straight to the heart of criminal law
theory: (1) Is duress a justification or an excuse? (2) Is the common
law rule disallowing duress as a defense to murder sound? (3) Is it
proper to condition the availability of the defense on the existence of
strict proportionality between the harm caused by the defendant's
actions and the harm averted? 9
Unfortunately, the justices who took part in the Erdemovic case
did not adequately address these fundamental queries. 10
They
assumed that the defense raised was a justification, even though a
plausible argument could have been made in favor of classifying it as
an excuse."
Therefore, the justices failed to examine whether
Erdemovic was claiming that his wrongful act should be excused

2.
Id. 11.
3.
Id. 18.
4.
Id.
5.
Id. 118.
6.
Id. 119.
7.
Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dissenting
Opinion of Judge Cassese, T 41 (Oct. 7, 1997).
8.
Id. 50.
9.
See generally Joshua Dressier, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the
Excuse and Searchingfor its Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331 (1989) (discussing
the importance of the justification versus excuse distinction).
10.
See Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Judgment on Appeal,
11 17-21 (Oct. 7, 1997).
11.
Id.
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because he was coerced, rather than that his act was justified because
he did the right thing by choosing the lesser evil. The fact that they
ignored this is particularly surprising in light of many, if not most,
scholars' belief that the defense of duress is an excuse and not a
12
justification.
Complicating the matter is the fact that, even if one were to
conclude that duress functions as an excuse, it is not evident that it
should be a defense to every crime. Some have suggested that duress
should not be a defense to murder. 13 Furthermore, even if one
believes that duress should be a defense to murder, one could still
argue that duress should not excuse the commission of a crime
14
against humanity that involves the commission of many murders.
To ascertain whether it is correct to excuse those who commit murder
or crimes against humanity because they were coerced, it is necessary
to examine the rationale that justifies excusing those who perform
wrongful acts. Even though some have tackled the question of
whether the rationale for excusing actors should compel the legal
community to accept duress as a defense to murder, a similar
15
analysis is wanting in the context of crimes against humanity.
Finally, it is unclear whether a defendant should be able to
successfully plead duress when the harm caused was of epic
proportions.
It may very well be that, under certain extreme
circumstances, society could legitimately require the coerced actor to
do everything in her power, even sacrifice her own life, to avert the
grave harm that would be inflicted if she succumbed to the threat.
Therefore, it makes sense to ask whether a defendant like Erdemovic

12.
See, e.g., Dressier, supra note 9; see also MARKUS DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW:
MODEL PENAL CODE 251 (2002) (describing duress as "the excuse analogue to the
justification of necessity"); Kyron Huigens, Duress is Not a Justification, 2 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 303 (2004) (discussing duress as an excuse). The drafters of the Model Penal
Code also believed that duress was an excuse and not a justification. See MODEL
PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.09 cmt. 2 (1985).

The problem of § 2.09 [duress], then, reduces to the question of whether there
are cases where the actor cannot justify his conduct under § 3.02 [choice of
evils], as when his choice involves an equal or greater evil than that
threatened, but where he nonetheless should be excused because he was
subjected to coercion.
13.
See, e.g., JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 448 (2d ed.
1960). Several courts have also held that duress is not a defense to grave crimes such
as murder. See State v. St. Clair, 262 S.W.2d 25, 27 (Mo. 1953); Nall v. Commonwealth,
271 S.W. 1059 (Ky. 1925).
14.
It should be noted that crimes against humanity include acts other than
murder, such as rape, enslavement, torture, etc. For a discussion of the different
modes of commission of crimes against humanity, see ANTONIO CASSESE,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 74-81 (2003). The defendant in Erdemovic, however,
was charged with having committed the offense by way of the perpetration of multiple
murders.
15.
See Dressler, supra note 9, at 1367-74.
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should be held responsible in view of the fact that the harm he
inflicted (the deaths of dozens of people) is significantly graver than
the one he averted (the loss of his own life). 16 A satisfactory answer
to this question requires an elucidation of the role of proportionality
in the context of excuse defenses.
This Article will examine these three problems in four parts.
Part II probes the opinions in the Erdemovic case with the purpose of
demonstrating that both the majority and the dissent treated the
duress defense as if it were a claim of justification. Part III argues
that their conclusion was injudicious and that, properly understood,
duress is an excuse, not a justification. Part III also argues that, in
light of the nature of the defense, it is unwise to disallow claims of
duress when the offense charged is murder.
Part IV attempts to show that the arguments in favor of
permitting the defendant to claim duress weaken as the seriousness
of the offense increases. This contention, which this Article calls the
"seriousness of the offense" thesis, provides intuitive support for
distinguishing cases in which the defendant pleads duress to a crime
involving the killing of one human being from those in which the
actor claims duress as a defense to the killing of dozens or hundreds
of persons. While human sensibilities seem to point toward allowing
the defense in cases of the former type, these intuitions do not
support permitting the claim in situations of the latter type.
This Article finds theoretical support for the intuitions upon
which the seriousness of the offense thesis is grounded in what the
Author terms the "understandable choice" theory of duress.
According to this theory, a coerced actor is properly excused when her
decision to engage in wrongful conduct finds sufficient understanding
amongst the community to warrant an exemption from liability. The
latter portion of Part IV points out two factors that should be taken
into account when making the aforementioned determination,
namely: (1) whether the defendant had a legal duty to resist the
threats he faced, even if refusing to succumb would lead to the
defendant's death; and (2) whether the actor could have prevented
harm to the victims by refusing to capitulate to the coercion.
Finally, Part V applies the understandable choice theory of
duress to the facts in the Erdemovic case. After balancing the
competing considerations, Part V concludes that the defendant should
have been able to claim duress as a defense to the killing of dozens of
civilians. Because the civilians would have died anyway at the hands
of other soldiers, resisting the threats would have been useless. Even
though this fact does not negate the wrongfulness of the defendant's

16.
See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Judgment on Appeal,
3 (Oct. 7, 1997) (setting forth the facts of the case).
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act (i.e., justify the conduct), it should exempt Erdemovic and those
like him from responsibility (i.e., excuse the defendant from liability).

II.

CHRONICLES OF A CONFUSION FORETOLD: THE OPINIONS IN THE
17
ERDEMOVIC CASE

A. The Majority Opinion: Duress as a Justification
Three of the five ICTY justices who decided Erdemovic ruled that
duress is not a defense to murder or to crimes against humanity. 18 In
doing so, they adopted the common law rule that duress is not a
defense to the killing of innocent human beings. 19 After examining
the writings of common law scholars such as Blackstone and Stephen,
they concluded that "[i]f national law denies recognition of duress as
a defence in respect of the killing of innocent persons, international
criminal law can do no less than match that policy since it deals with
20
murders often of far greater magnitude.
This conclusion was greatly influenced by Hale's famous
assertion that "if a man be desperately assaulted, and in peril of
death, and cannot otherwise escape, unless to satisfy his assailant's
fury he will kill an innocent person then present, the fear and actual
force will not acquit him of the crime and punishment of murder, if he
commit the fact for he ought rather to die himself, than kill an
innocent. '2 1 Underlying the position adopted by the majority is the
maxim that it can never be right to kill an innocent human being
because the contrary rule would violate the "special sanctity that the
law attaches to human life."2 2 Consequently, no one should have a

17.
For a more detailed account of the different opinions in the Erdemovic case,
see Ram6n I. Ragu6s, Debe el Miedo Insuperable Exculpar a un Soldado Acusado de
Crimenes de Lesa Humanidad?, 7 REVISTA DE DERECHO PENAL Y CRIMINOLOGIA 95

(2001).
18.
Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion of
Judges McDonald and Vohrah (Oct. 7, 1997); Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-9622-A, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Li (Oct. 7, 1997).
19.
See generally Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Judgment on
Appeal (Oct. 7, 1997).
20.
Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22.A, Joint Separate Opinion of
Judges McDonald and Vohrah,
75 (Oct. 7, 1997); see also Prosecutor v. Erdemovic,
Case No. IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Li, 12 (Oct. 7, 1997)
(expressing his agreement with Judges McDonald and Vohrah's views regarding the
applicability of the duress defense to the case at bar).
21.
Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion of
Judges McDonald and Vohrah, 71 (Oct. 7, 1997) (citing 1 SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE
HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 51 (1800)).
22.
Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion of
Judges McDonald and Vohrah, 71 (Oct. 7, 1997) (quoting R. v. Howe, [1987] A.C. 417,
439 (H.L.) (conjoined appeals) (U.K.)).
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legal right to choose that one innocent person be killed instead of
23
another.
As this Author has discussed at length elsewhere, 24 these are the
same considerations that underpin the common law rule that one
cannot justify the killing of an innocent person by way of the
However, one important
necessity or choice of evils defense. 25
difference between the common law rules that "necessity is not a
defense to murder" and "duress is not a defense to a crime involving
is a
the death of an innocent human being" is that necessity
26
justification, whereas duress is usually considered an excuse.
The importance of the aforesaid fact should not be understated.
Justifications negate the wrongfulness of the act, while excuses
merely exclude the actor's culpability without eliminating the
wrongful nature of the conduct. 27 Therefore, when an actor claims to
be justified, he is asserting that he has a right to engage in the prima
28
facie prohibited conduct.
For example, if Joe alleges that he justifiably killed Mary in selfdefense, he is claiming that he had a right to avert Mary's wrongful

attack, even if that involved violating the prima facie prohibition
against killing people. However, when an actor claims to be excused,
he is not asserting a right to engage in the prima facie wrongful
Excused actors merely contend that they should be
conduct.2 9

exculpated because they did not perform the admittedly wrongful act

23.
24.

Id.
See Luis E. Chiesa, Normative Gaps in the Criminal Law: A Reasons
Theory of Wrongdoing, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 102 (2007) (discussing considerations
that underpin the common law rule that one cannot justify the killing of an innocent
person by way of the necessity or choice of evils defense).
See, e.g., R. v. Dudley & Stephens, (1884) 14 Q.B.D. 273.
25.
See, e.g., Dressler, supra note 9; see also DUBBER, supra note 12, at 251
26.
(discussing duress and necessity); Huigens, supra note 12 (same).
See, e.g., Dressier, supra note 9; see also DUBBER, supra note 12, at 251
27.
(discussing duress and necessity); Huigens, supra note 12 (same).
28.
For a cogent defense of the idea that justifications confer rights to infringe
on a prohibitory norm, see EUGENIO RAUL ZAFFARONI, DERECHO PENAL PARTE
GENERAL 590 (2d ed. 2002) (stating that justification attaches when the prohibitory
norm is "qualified" in such a manner that it is recognized that justified actors are
"exercising a right" to engage in a prima facie wrongful action). Fletcher prefers to say
that justifications confer "privileges" to infringe on the prohibitory norm. GEORGE P.
FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 562-66 (2000). This Author does not think
there is an important difference between Fletcher's description of justifications as the
exercise of privileges and the Author's definition of justifications as the exercise of
rights. See Fletcher's statement that "justifications generate prima facie rights" in
George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV. 949, 978 (1985).
29.
B. Sharon Byrd, Till Death Do Us Part: A Comparative Law Approach to
Justifying Lethal Self-Defense by Battered Women, 1 DUKE J. COMP. & INVL L. 169, 170
n.9 (1991) (asserting that justifications confer a right to engage in the prima facie
prohibited conduct, whereas excuses do not).
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in a blameworthy manner. 30 Thus, if Joe alleges that he killed Mary
while he was insane, he is not claiming that he had a right to harm
Mary. Rather, he seeks to be exonerated because he did not kill Mary
in a blameworthy manner, as he was insane when he committed the
31
offense.
Therefore, the question that the majority of the justices in
Erdemovic asked-whether the coerced defendant had a right to kill
innocent civilians-was only relevant if the defendant alleged that he
was justified in committing the offense.3 2 However, if the defendant's
claim was merely that he should have been excused for wrongfully
killing innocent civilians, inquiring whether he had a privilege or a
right to commit murder is entirely irrelevant.3 3 Evidence of coercion
would be pertinent to establishing whether he should be excused from
blame for killing innocent civilians but not for demonstrating that his
actions were justified.
Because the justices conceived of the defense as one of
justification, they then followed- the common law and concluded that
Erdemovic could not plead duress as a defense to a crime against
humanity. 34 They did not consider that his claim might have been
examined as one of excuse. 35 As subsequent Parts of this Article will
demonstrate, treating duress as a defense of excuse might have
changed the outcome of the case.
B. Judge Cassese's DissentingOpinion:Duress as a Halfway House
between Justification and Excuse
Judge Cassese, dissenting in the Erdemovic decision, criticized
the majority's approach to the question of whether duress should be a

30.
Owen S. Walker, Why Should Irresponsible Offenders be Excused?, 46 J.
PHIL. 279, 279 (1969) (stating that excuses render violators of norms blameless); see
also Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CAL. L. REV. 257, 261 (1987) (asserting
that excuses deny blame for a harm done).
31.
The Author chose to illustrate the nature of excuses by way of the insanity
defense because there is some debate regarding whether other claims, such as selfdefense or duress, constitute justifications or excuses.
However, there is no
controversy about the fact that insanity is an excuse. Thus, as Professor Kim Ferzan
has stated, insanity is the "classic instance" of an excuse. Kimberly Kessler Ferzan,
Defending Imminence: From Battered Women to Iraq, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 213, 218 (2004).
32.
Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Judgment on Appeal (Oct. 7,
1997).
33.
Continental scholars agree with this criticism of the Erdemovic case. See,
e.g., Raguds, supra note 17, at 130 (stating that "when the majority [of the judges in
the case] conflate claims of justification with claims of excuse ... they are turning their
back on the real core of the debate.").
34.
Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Judgment on Appeal,
5
(Oct. 7, 1997).
35.
Id.
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defense to a crime against humanity. 3 6 He.particularly disapproved
of the conclusion that the common law rule against raising duress as
a defense to a crime involving the death of innocent persons should be
adopted in the international arena. 37
His argument can be
summarized as follows:
(1) Under international law, the general rule is that duress can be
pleaded as a defense as long as several stringent requirements are
38
met;
(2)

No customary rule of international law has crystallized regarding
whether duress can be raised in a case involving war crimes or
39
crimes against humanity;

(3) In the absence of a specific rule of international criminal law
governing the subject, the general rule regarding duress should
apply in cases of crimes against humanity. Therefore, a claim of
duress can be raised in these cases as long as the strict
requirements that condition the availability of the defense under
40
traditional international law are met.

Judge Cassese thoroughly examined the applicable case law on
the subject and concluded that the evidence in favor of an exception to
the general rule that duress can be pleaded as a defense to any crime
was scarce and, in any case, inconclusive. 4 1 Additionally, he cited
several Italian and German cases that provided support to his claim
that duress could be raised as a defense to a crime involving the
42
murder of innocent human beings.
However, Judge Cassese concluded that duress could only be a
defense to the killing of innocent civilians if the harm caused was less
than the one averted. 4 3 By inserting this strict proportionality
requirement, he infelicitously attached a justificatory constraint to

36.
Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dissenting
Opinion of Judge Cassese (Oct. 7, 1997).
37.
Id.
11.
38.
Id.
39.
Id.
40.
Id.
41.
Id. 44.
42.
Id.
35-36 (discussing Bernardi and Randazzo, a decision of the Italian
Court of Cassation of July 14, 1947 (handwritten text on file with International
Criminal Tribunal)); Cass., sez. pen., 6 Nov. 1947, n.2557, Giur. It. Cass. Crim. 1947,
414; Landgericht [LG] [Trial Court] May 21, 1948, 2 Justiz und NS-Verbrechen 521
(F.R.G.)).
43.
It is not clear whether necessity can be claimed as a justification to the
killing of innocent people. Judge Cassese's opinion could be read in a way that
supports an affirmative answer to this question. It should be pointed out, however,
that the common law rule seems to be that the necessity defense cannot justify the
taking of innocent life.
See, e.g., R v. Dudley & Stephens, (1884) 14 Q.B.D. 273.
However, the drafters of the Model Penal Code suggest that the actor should be
justified if he saves more lives than the ones that he sacrifices. See MODEL PENAL
CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 3.02 cmt. 3 (1985). For a more detailed examination of
these issues, see Chiesa, supra note 24.
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the defense of duress. Judge Cassese's solution elides the difference
between choice of evils and duress defenses and, consequently,
Because necessity is a
between justifications and excuses.
justification, it seems proper to limit the scope of the defense by
requiring that the harm averted be greater than the harm caused.
Only then should the conduct not be regarded wrongful.
However, if Erdemovic was claiming that his admittedly
wrongful act should be excused because of duress, it would not make
much sense to subject his claim to stringent proportionality
requirements. 44 By definition, excused conduct is wrongful conduct.
Consequently, the reason the excused actor is acquitted is because
the circumstances of the offense indicate that it would be unfair to
blame her for committing the wrongful act. 45 Whether or not the
excused actor's conduct was the lesser of two evils is, in principle,
Therefore, as Professor Paul Robinson has correctly
irrelevant.
pointed out, limiting the scope of excuse defenses by conditioning
their availability upon the existence of strict proportion between the
harm caused and the harm averted would
[erroneously] impl[y] that the actor must avoid a greater harm to
receive an [excuse] defense. Such a requirement undermines the
rationale for [excuse defenses]. As [the previous discussion] illustrates,
justifications encourage conduct that creates a net benefit, while
excuses exculpate actors who cause a net harm but who are
blameless.

46

As a result of this, if the defendant in Erdemovic was alleging
that it would be unfair to punish him for his wrongful act because he
was coerced into killing innocent persons, his claim was one of excuse
and not of justification. If this was the case, Judge Cassese's decision
to limit the availability of the duress defense to instances where the
actor chose the lesser evil is cast into doubt.
Unfortunately, the drafters of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court seemed to follow Cassese's position
regarding duress. 47 Hence, according to the Rome Statute, duress is a
defense if, and only if, "the person does not intend to cause a greater
harm than the one sought to be avoided. '48 This provision blurs the
distinction between justification and excuse under international

44.
The Author does not mean to imply that proportionality never plays a role
when determining whether an actor should be excused. It might be coherently argued
that someone under duress should refuse to engage in an act that causes a great deal
more harm than the harm avoided. However, the proportionality requirement that
could attach in the context of claims of excuse is much more lax than the one that is
traditionally employed in the context of justifications.
45.
46.

See supra note 44.
2 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES 367-68 (1984).

47.
Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 31(d), July 17, 1998, 37
I.L.M. 999.
Id.
48.
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criminal law because it conditions the availability of the defense upon
a proportionality requirement characteristic of justifications, even
though duress is considered by many to be an excuse. 4 9 Surprisingly,
international law scholars have uncritically accepted the Rome
Statute's take on the subject. 50 Gerhard Werle, for example, recently
stated that duress can only be pleaded as a defense when the crime
' 51
committed is "on balance, the lesser of two evils.'
If the international legal community adopts Justice Cassese's
and the Rome Statute's position that duress should be conceived of as
a variation of the justificatory necessity defense that is only available
when the actor chooses the lesser of two evils, then it seems clear that
duress would seldom, if ever, be a defense to a crime against
humanity involving the commission of multiple murders. The evil of
killing many civilians will always be equal to or greater than the evil
of killing the coerced actor. 52 Consequently, it would be nearly
impossible for defendants like Erdemovic to prove that they chose the
lesser evil when they committed the crime. However, if duress were
considered an excuse, there would be no need to restrict its scope by
requiring that the harm caused by the actor be strictly proportional to
the one prevented.53 The most relevant consideration would be
whether the actor should be blamed and punished for having
committed the crime while under coercion to do so.
It is precisely this claim-that duress is an excuse that should
not be subjected to stringent proportionality standards-that the next
Part of this Article defends.

III.

THE NATURE OF THE DURESS DEFENSE AND ITS AVAILABILITY IN
CASES OF MURDER

As proposed in Part II, in order to establish whether the duress
defense functions as a justification or as an excuse, one should ask
whether it negates the wrongfulness of the act (and thus is a

49.
See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 28, at 831-33; see also Kent Greenawalt,
Natural Law and Political Choice: The General Justification Defense-Criteria for
Political Action and the Duty to Obey the Law, Lecture at the Catholic University of
America (Apr. 15, 1986), in 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 24-25 (1986) (suggesting that
duress, as opposed to the lesser-evils defense, is an excuse, not a justification).
50.
See, e.g., GERHARD WERLE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
147 (2005).

51.
Id.
52.
It might, however, be argued that the evil of killing many civilians is less
than the evil of killing the coerced actor if the coerced actor could not have prevented
the civilians' deaths.
53.
It should be noted that continental criminal law theorists also believe that
an actor can have a valid duress claim even if he inflicts more harm than the one
averted. See, e.g., JUAN J. BUSTOS RAMiREZ & HERNAN HORMAZABAL MALARtE, II
LECCIONES DE DERECHO PENAL 380-87 (1999).
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justification) 54 or the blameworthiness of the actor (and thus is an
excuse). 55 It is illustrative of the point to analyze a hypothetical case
of exculpatory duress in order to ascertain whether the defendant
should be acquitted because he made the right choice, or rather
because the defendant performed a wrongful act in a nonblameworthy manner.
Assume, for example, that Larry threatened to kill Joe and his
family if Joe refused to help him rob the First National Bank.
Assume also that Larry's threat is real, that he has the capacity to
cause the threatened harm, and that Joe's only genuine chance of
avoiding this harm is to help Larry rob the bank. If Joe decides to
help Larry rob the bank in order to save himself and his family, he
probably would not be convicted robbery because he acted under
duress. Although it seems intuitive that Joe should be exonerated,
the reason is not entirely clear. Is it that, under the circumstances,
robbing the bank was the right thing to do, or that, even though
robbing the bank was a wrongful act, it would be unjust to punish Joe
for his wrongdoing?
This Article proposes that the proper conclusion is that Joe
committed an unjustified act that should nevertheless be excused.
Justified acts are acts that ought to be encouraged, or at least
tolerated, by society, and robbing a bank to avoid personal harm is
not conduct that society should encourage or tolerate. 56 A society
might be willing to acquit the coerced bank robber out of compassion
for his circumstances, but not out of a belief that others should opt to
rob banks when faced with similar threats. 57 It might also be argued
that the state should not punish its citizens for failing to resist
threats that most citizens would also have failed to resist. It does not
follow, however, that such a failure should escape condemnation.
Acquittal in these cases is more the product of a concession to human
frailty than of a societal determination that the actor's conduct was,
58
on balance, not wrongful.
Even though there are good reasons to conclude that Joe's act
should not be justified, the same cannot be said about whether it
should be excused. Excuses express understanding for the actor who,
because of extreme circumstances or personal disabilities, cannot be

54.
DUBBER, supra note 12, at 251.
55.
Id.
56.
Paul H. Robinson, Rules of Conduct and Principles of Adjudication, 57 U.
CHI. L. REV. 729, 749 (1990).
57.
On the relationship between practices of excusing and sentiments of
compassion, see generally Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform
and the ProvocationDefense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331 (1997).
58.
Jeremy Horder, Autonomy, Provocation and Duress, 1992 CRIM. L. REV.
707, in READINGS IN CRIMINAL LAW 487 (Russell L. Weaver et al. eds., 1998)
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fairly expected to abstain from committing the wrongful act. 59 Thus,
in order to determine if Joe's robbing of the bank should be excused,
one must ask whether a reasonable person in his position would also
have elected to commit the crime. Usually, it would be unfair to
punish someone for succumbing to a threat that a normal law-abiding
citizen would have been unable to resist. In Joe's case, it seems quite
clear that it would be unfair to punish him for deciding to rob the
bank in order to avoid harm to himself and his family. Most people
would probably have chosen the same course of action. Consequently,
Joe's wrongful act should be excused. His conduct, however, remains
wrongful. Society should condemn the acts of those who yield to
threats and inflict significant harm on innocent persons.
Nonetheless, it is sensible not to punish such actors who were
subjected to coercion that made their decisions to engage in the
criminal acts understandable. All in all, their conduct, though
60
wrongful, is not blameworthy.
If it is true, as this Part has attempted to show by way of this
hypothetical, that duress is an excuse, then it would, as a general
rule, be improper to limit its availability to cases where the actor
chose the lesser evil. The reason excused actors are acquitted is that
it is not fair to blame them for their actions, not that their actions
were right. Thus, the only pertinent inquiry is whether society could
have reasonably required the defendant to overcome the coercion and
resist the threats. Consequently, whether the harm caused by the
coerced actor was greater than the one averted is, as a general rule,
not determinative.61
If duress is an excuse, the common law blanket rule excluding it
as a defense to murder should be rejected. Granting an excuse to an
actor who kills under coercion is not tantamount to recognizing that
she had a right to kill her victim. 6 2 In these cases, the harm averted
by the actor was not greater than the one produced and, therefore,
her conduct is still considered wrongful. However, in most cases,
someone who wrongfully kills an innocent human being while under
coercion should not be punished if most members of the society would

59.
B. Sharon Byrd, Wrongdoing and Attribution: Implications Beyond the
Justification-ExcuseDistinction, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1289, 1290 (1987).
60.
Recently, Peter Westen and James Mangiafico argued that duress is better
conceived as a justification. See Peter Westen & James Mangiafico, The Criminal
Defense of Duress: A Justification,Not an Excuse-And Why it Matters, 6 BUFF. CRIM.
L. REV. 833 (2003). Their position, though provocative, is ultimately unconvincing. For
a refutation of Westen and Mangiafico's arguments, see Huigens, supra note 12.
61.
See ROBINSON, supra note 46, at 368 (stating that the concerns
underpinning the notion that duress should only be available when the actor's conduct
avoided a greater harm that the one caused are "misplaced").
62.
Id. at 368-69.
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have done the same thing.6 3 In these instances, punishing those who
succumb to the threat and commit murder would typically not be
warranted on either utilitarian or deontological grounds. From a
utilitarian perspective, people who kill a stranger in order to avoid
harm to themselves or their loved ones are not deterrable by criminal
sanctions.6 4 In contrast, from a deontological standpoint, punishing
someone who succumbed to a threat to which most people would have
also yielded is unjust. 65 Hence, as the drafters of the Model Penal
Code have stated, imposing punishment in such cases is almost
invariably "bound to be an ineffective threat [and would] be divorced
66
from any moral base.1

IV. SHOULD DURESS BE A DEFENSE TO A CRIME INVOLVING THE
KILLING OF DOZENS OF INNOCENT HUMAN BEINGS?

A. Proportionality,Demanding Heroism, and the Seriousness
of the Offense Thesis
Crimes against humanity often involve murder. 67 Therefore, one
could argue that if duress is a defense to murder, it should also be a
defense to crimes against humanity that involve murder. However, a
majority of the justices in Erdemovic reasoned that, even if duress is
a defense to murder, it does not follow that it should also be a defense
to the large-scale killings of innocent civilians. 68 According to these
judges, crimes against humanity, unlike discrete acts of murder,
"affect, or should affect, each and every member of mankind,
whatever his or her nationality, ethnic group and location. '69 As a
result of this, they contend that a crime against humanity is a more
heinous offense than murder and, for that reason, defendants should
not be allowed to plead duress as a defense to a crime against
humanity even if they are allowed to do so when charged with
70
murder.

63.
See, e.g., Steven J. Mulroy, The Duress Defense's Uncharted Terrain:
Applying it to Murder, Felony Murder, and the Mentally Retarded Defendant, 43 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 159 (2006); see also JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAw

325-26 (4th ed. 2005) (discussing whether duress is a justification or an excuse);
FLETCHER, supra note 28, at 830-31 (discussing duress as an excuse).
64.
See supra Parts II-III.
65.
Id.
66.

MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES §2.09 (1985).

67.
See CASSESE, supranote 14 (discussing crimes against humanity).
68.
See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion
of Judges McDonald and Vohrah, 75 (Oct. 7, 1997).
69.
Id. 21.
70.
It is said that, all things being equal, a crime against humanity is a graver
offense than a discrete murder because of the "collective nature" of the victim. See
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This Article refers to the aforementioned argument as the
"seriousness of the offense" thesis. Proponents of this thesis hold
that, even though duress is usually a defense to any crime, it may
properly be disallowed when the social harm caused by the
commission of the offense is extremely disproportional to the harm
averted. 71 The following hypotheticals test the viability of this thesis:
(1)

The Coerced Murderer: Hugo threatened to take the life of
Angel's son if Angel refused to kill Gary, an innocent third
person. Angel capitulated to the threat. He was charged with
murdering Gary. Angel pleaded duress.

(2)

The Coerced Terrorist: Frank threatened to kill Jerry, a wellknown maker of explosives, if Jerry refused to help him build a
bomb that was to be placed inside a government building. Jerry
succumbed to the threat and helped Frank build the bomb and
place it inside the building. More than one hundred innocent
people died when the bomb exploded. Jerry was charged with
murdering the people inside the building. He pleaded duress.

(3)

The Nuclear Bomb: Jack is a nuclear physicist employed by the
government to help with the design of nuclear bombs. Lazarus
threatened to kill Jack's family if Jack refused to design,
manufacture, and help him detonate a nuclear bomb over Los
Angeles. Jack yielded to the coercion and helped Lazarus fulfill
his plan. Over half a million people died. Jack was charged with
murdering the people who died when the nuke exploded. He
pleaded duress.

Arguably, the harm caused by the coerced murderer is less
serious than the one caused by the coerced terrorist. The harm
produced by the nuclear physicist, however, is clearly graver the ones
caused in the other two cases. Applying the seriousness of the offense
thesis to these three hypotheticals would yield the following results:
(1)

The Coerced Murderer: The harm produced by the defendant
(Gary's death) is not much graver than the one averted (Angel's
son's death). Therefore, there are good arguments in favor of

Robert D. Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of InternationalPunishment: The Limits of
the National Law Analogy and the Potential of InternationalCriminal Law, 43 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 39, 59 (2007).

71.
See, e.g., Dressier, supra note 9; see also DUBBER, supra note 12, at 254
("Even in extreme emergencies, facing almost certain death, the Code thus allows a
defense only if the actor balanced the potential harms of action and inaction, to herself
and others, and then chooses the less harmful course of action (or inaction).").
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permitting the actor to plead duress as a defense to the crime
charged.
(2)

The Coerced Terrorist: The harm wreaked by the defendant (the
deaths of one hundred people) is greater than the loss prevented
(his and his family's deaths). In spite of this, it is not clear of
how much greater a magnitude was the harm produced than the
one averted. However, it is plausible that, in light of the large
number of deaths caused by the defendant's action, his plea of
duress as a defense to the crime charged should fail.

(3)

The Nuclear Bomb: The harm caused by the defendant's action
(more than half a million deaths) is much greater than the one
prevented (the deaths of his loved ones). The harm produced
was extremely disproportional to the one averted. Therefore, if
one assumes that Jack could have avoided causing such grave
harm by not yielding to the threat, there are compelling reasons
in favor of disallowing duress as a defense to the offense charged.

The arguments in favor of allowing the coerced murderer to
plead the duress defense while at the same time disallowing the
defense by the nuclear physicist are well-established. The case of the
coerced terrorist is a closer call, but the seriousness of the offense
thesis offers intuitive support for punishing the defendant.
There is some support in philosophical literature for the
seriousness of the offense thesis. Several well-known scholars seem
to believe that individuals may be required to perform heroic acts of
self-sacrifice if that is the only way of saving numerous lives.
Professor Joshua Dressler, for example, has argued that
[s]ociety... has a right to expect a person to demonstrate a higher level
of moral strength when ordered to kill a hundred innocent children
than when commanded to kill one. A jury might also rightly expect
people to manifest the utmost moral strength--even, at some point, to
choose death-when they have reason to know that they are playing a
part, even a minor role, in an especially barbaric scenario, such as the
72
Holocaust.

Similarly, Professor Fletcher has stated that "if the cost in human
lives is sufficiently high we could properly expect someone to resist
threats to his own life."'73
Likewise, Professor Paul Robinson
concluded in his treatise on criminal law defenses that
[i]t is reasonable to assume that given threats of equal gravity, the
resistance of the person of reasonable firmness would be
directly related to the seriousness of the compelled offense. The
law-abiding person may be unable to resist coercion if he must commit

72.
73.

Dressler, supra note 9, at 1374.
FLETCHER, supra note 28, at 833.
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forgery to avoid the threat but able to resist the same threat if he must
74
kill an innocent.

The intuitions grounding the seriousness of the offense thesis are
shared by criminal law theorists on the other side of the Atlantic.
Spanish commentators Bustos and Hormazdbal, for example, have
asserted that "although [duress] allows for an exemption from
punishment in cases in which the harm caused is greater than the
one [avoided], the harm caused cannot be disproportionately greater
[than the one averted] .
These scholars hint at the possibility that, under certain
circumstances-such as when the harm that the actor is coerced to
inflict is extremely disproportional to the one averted-it might be
proper for society to demand that the agent resist the threat even if
this requires sacrificing her own life. Although this conclusion is
intuitively appealing, it raises several problems.
Accepting this thesis would lead to punishing the defendants in
the coerced terrorist and nuclear bomb cases for failing to make a
heroic sacrifice so that many people can live. This is contrary to the
principle that the law has no right to demand that people engage in
acts of heroism. 76 This principle is so entrenched in U.S. criminal law
that the drafters of the Model Penal Code expressly stated that the
basis for the exculpation afforded by the duress defense is that it
would be socially debilitating to "demand that heroism be the
standard of legality. ' '77 After all, "the standard is that of the
reasonable man, not the reasonable hero. '78 Moreover, for the law to
demand heroic self-sacrifice would be hypocritical because most
persons of reasonable moral firmness are incapable of abiding by such
79
a high standard.
This alone does not resolve the question against demanding that
ordinary people act in heroic ways, as Professor Dressler has rightly
pointed out:
It is not inevitably hypocritical for a juror to concede that most people
in the sa~ne situation, including the juror, would have acted as the
defendant did, yet still believe that the coerced actor deserves to be
punished. As long as the juror believes that the juror also would be

74.
ROBINSON, supranote 46, at 367 (emphasis added).
75.
BUSTOS RAMiREZ & HORMAZABAL MALARtE, supra note 53, at 387.
76.
For cases that suggest that the law cannot demand heroism from its
citizens, see, for example, State v. Toscano, 378 A.2d 755 (N.J. 1977), and State v. Van
Dyke, 825 A.2d 1163 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003).
77.
MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.09 (1985).
78.
Alan Reed, Duress and Provocationas Excuses to Murder: Salutary Lessons
from Recent Anglo-American Jurisprudence,6 J. TRANSNAT'L. L. & POL'Y 51, 55 (1996).
79.
MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.09 (1985).
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deserving of punishment (and, presumably, would accept it) in the same
80
situation, there is no hypocrisy.

An additional problem with the seriousness of the offense thesis
is that it cannot be easily reconciled with the widely defended "hard
choice" and "involuntariness" theories of duress. According to the
hard choice theory of duress, an actor is excused when the coercive
situation puts him in the undesirable position of having to decide to
preserve either his interests or the interests of others.8 1 Those who
face this "do it or else" situation do not act culpably if they choose to
harm others because society believes that a reasonable person facing
the same hard choice would have acted in the same manner.8 2 The
hard choice theory of duress produces different results than the
seriousness of the offense thesis because the actors in the cases of the
coerced terrorist and the nuclear bomb faced what could be called an
unfairly hard choice. Thus, contrary to the conclusion reached earlier
in this Subpart regarding these cases, they should both be acquitted
under the hard choice theory of the duress defense.
The same results follow from an examination of the
involuntariness theory of duress. 8 3 According to this theory, duress
exculpates actors whose choice-making capabilities are substantially
reduced by the coercive situation that generates the defense.8 4 This
reduction in the actor's capacity to choose not to yield to the threat
makes her choice to engage in the wrongful act tantamount to a
decision that has been forced upon her. 85 Thus, it has been stated
that the actor's choice to protect her interests at the expense of others
is in reality "no choice at all" and that duress exculpates the actor
because her capacity to choose to do otherwise is "absent" in light of
the coercion.8 6 In a similar vein, an English court has asserted that
duress is an excuse when the coercion faced by the defendant

Dressier, supra note 9, at 1368-69.
80.
See infra note 82.
81.
82.
For an examination and defense of the "hard-choice" theory of excuse and
duress, see Stephen J. Morse, Deprivation and Desert, in FROM SOCIAL JUSTICE TO
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAw 124-29
(William C. Heffernan & John Kleinig eds., 2000); Michael S. Moore, Responsibility
and the Unconscious, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1563, 1567, 1663-64 (1990).
The involuntariness theory of duress has informed various state supreme
83.
court decisions about the scope and nature of the defense. See, e.g., State v. Rouleau,
528 A.2d 343, 350 (Conn. 1987) (stating that since the effect of duress is to "reduce the
person to a state of involuntariness," the prosecution should bear the burden of
disproving the defense beyond a reasonable doubt); see also People v. Graham, 57 Cal.
App. 3d 238 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (asserting that a claim of duress "casts doubt on the
voluntariness of the [defendant's] acts" (emphasis added)).
84.
See Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self, 105
HARV. L. REV. 959, 997 (1992) ("[T]he defense of duress does not suggest a total lack of
choice. Instead, the defendant points to a severe limitation of choice caused by a
serious threat made against him.").
85.
DUBBER, supranote 12, at 251.
86.
Id.
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"overb[ears]" the defendant's will to such a degree that the offense
committed can "no longer" be considered to be the consequence of her
"voluntary act[s]."' 87
The involuntariness theory is also incompatible with the
intuitive solution to the cases of the coerced terrorist and the nuclear
bomb. While the seriousness of the offense thesis would lead to the
convictions of both defendants, they would be acquitted under an
involuntariness theory of duress because the coercion to which they
were subjected significantly reduced their ability to choose not to
commit the crime.
Despite the logical appeal of the seriousness of the offense thesis,
it seems fair to say that, in view of the aforementioned problems,
"[v]ery much more needs to be said about duress ...and in particular
about whether the law can properly sometimes demand heroism of
us."8 8 Thus, the next Part elaborates an alternative conception of the
duress defense that can adequately account for the seriousness of the
offense thesis without falling prey to the problems that plague the
hard choice and involuntariness theories. First, however, the next
Part demonstrates why these two conceptions of duress cannot
satisfactorily explain many features of the defense.
B. Beyond the Hard Choice and Involuntariness Theories:Duress as
an "UnderstandableChoice"
Contrary to what some well-known scholars have argued, the
exculpatory nature of the duress defense does not entirely lie in the
fact that the coercive situation substantially reduced the choicemaking capabilities of the actor, in the extremely hard nature of the
choice faced by the person coerced, or in the involuntariness of the
actor's decision to engage in the conduct. 89 Regarding the hard choice
theory, it is not difficult to imagine examples of cases in which a
person would be convicted of an offense even though his decision to
commit the offense was the product of an extremely unfair and hard
choice. For example, someone who causes serious bodily harm to an
innocent person in order to avoid losing all his possessions should be
punished, even though his decision to engage in the conduct
constitutive of the offense was the consequence of an unfair and hard
choice.

87.
R v. Hudson, (1971) 2 Q.B. 202, 206.
88.
R. A. Duff, Virtue, Vice and Criminal Liability: Do We Want an Aristotelian
CriminalLaw?, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 147, 177 n.48 (2002).
89.
See generally DUBBER, supra note 12, at 251-59 (discussing the duress
defense); Morse, supra note 82 at 124-29 (giving an overview of the involuntariness
and hard-choice theories, respectively).
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Regarding the involuntariness theory, it should be noted that a
coerced actor's decision to yield to threats is not really involuntary. 90
Even though the choice that the actor faces is a difficult one, the actor
retains the capacity to choose not to capitulate to the coercive
demands. Thus, describing his conduct as involuntary is either false
or misleading. 91 Furthermore, the law routinely authorizes imposing
unmitigated punishment on defendants who lack a substantial
capacity to control their acts. 92 Take, for example, the case of a
defendant who, in a moment of temporary loss of self-control, shoots
and injures someone who had just finished raping his wife. Assuming
that the victim survived the defendant's attack, the law affords him
no partial or full excuse for his conduct. 93 If defendants in this
context are not excused in spite of their impaired volitional faculties,
it is unclear why they should be exempted from responsibility when
the alleged involuntariness is the product of coercion.
An examination of German criminal law and the German Penal
Code further illustrates the shortcomings of the hard choice and
involuntariness conceptions of duress.
According to § 35 of the
German Penal Code, duress is a defense when the coerced actor
"commits an unlawful act to avert [an imminent danger to life, limb,
or freedom] from himself, a relative or person close to him. ' 94 Notice
that the defense does not apply if the coerced actor yields to the
threat so that harm to property can be avoided. 95 Thus, even though
Aunt Maria loves Roxy-her three-year-old Yorkie-as if she were
her child, she would not be entitled to a duress defense under § 35 of
the German Penal Code if she chose to destroy the property of

90.
See Westen & Mangiafico, supra note 60, at 901 (stating that situations of
duress "differ significantly" from instances in which involuntariness is deemed to be a
defense to criminal liability).
91.
Perhaps because of the misleading nature of the assertion that duress gives
rise to a claim of involuntariness, Professor Stephen Morse has pointed out that the
involuntariness inherent in duress is "metaphorical."
Stephen J. Morse,
Uncontrollable Urges and IrrationalPeople, 88 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1056 (2002).
92.
See Alon Harel, Efficiency and Fairness in Criminal Law: The Case for a
Criminal Law Principle of ComparativeFault, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1181, 1214 n.92 (1994)
(noting that individuals who "fail to control ... impulses" such as "anger" can be "liable
for unmitigated homicide or murder" (quoting GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING
CRIMINAL LAW 247 (1978))).

93.
Id. It should be pointed out that had the victim in this hypothetical case
died, the defendant would have a valid "heat of passion" claim that would reduce his
responsibility from murder to manslaughter. The Author finds allowing "passion" as a
partial defense to murder and disallowing it in other contexts is somewhat arbitrary.
For a convincing argument in favor the creation of a generic claim of "partial
responsibility" available as a defense to any crime, see Stephen J. Morse, Diminished
Rationality,Diminished Responsibility, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 289, 289 (2003).
94.
Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] Nov. 13, 1998 BGBI. I at 945, § 35,
1 (F.R.G.) translatedin 28 THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES (Edward

M. Wise ed., Joseph J. Darby trans., 1987), available at http://wings.buffalo.edu/
law/bclc/germind.htm.
95.

Id.
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another in order to avoid harm to her beloved dog. This limitation
makes little sense under a hard choice or involuntariness theory of
duress. Aunt Maria loves Roxy very, very much. Consequently,
choosing between the wellbeing of her dog and causing harm to the
property of a stranger represents an unfairly hard choice for Maria.
Also, in light of the incredible, almost maternal, love that she feels for
Roxy, her capacity to choose not to harm her dog is substantially
reduced by the coercive situation. Alas, even if her choice is a very
difficult one and her decision is not free from unfair constraints, she
has no duress defense according to German criminal law.
The limitations that § 35 of the German Penal Code imposes on
the duress defense are not unique to continental legal systems. The
drafters of the U.S. Model Penal Code (MPC) also intended to limit
the defense in a similar manner. Even though at first glance the
provision contained in § 2.09 of the MPC appears to provide a defense
to anyone who yields to threats as long as it is demonstrated that a
''person of reasonable firmness" in the actor's situation would have
also succumbed to the coercion, 96 the Commentaries to the MPC
make it clear that some threats should never give rise to a valid claim
of duress. 97 Thus, the Commentaries to § 2.09 state that:
Given the nature of the problem [regarding the proper limits of the
duress defense] and the criteria proposed for its solution, it is
reasonable to confine the exculpation to the case where force against
the person of the actor or another, or the threat thereof, is the
instrument of coercion .... [W]hen the claimed excuse is that duress
was irresistible, threats to property or even reputation cannot exercise
sufficient power over persons of "reasonable firmness" to warrant
98
considerationin these terms.

It turns out that, despite its apparently broader formulation, the
MPC duress provision is almost identical in scope to the duress
provision of the German Penal Code. Whereas threats to the life or
limb of the coerced actor might provide a valid excuse under the
German Penal Code and the MPC, 99 threats to property and other
legally protected interests are not susceptible to the duress defense
under either code.' 00 Hence, Aunt Maria would not fare better in an

96.

MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (1962).

97.
See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.09 cmt. 3 (1985) (outlining
limitations to the duress defense).
98.
Id. (emphasis added).
99.
Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] Nov. 13, 1998 BGBI. I at 945, § 35,
1 (F.R.G.) translatedin 28 THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES (Edward
M. Wise ed., Joseph J. Darby trans., 1987), available at http://wings.buffalo.edu/law/
bclc/germind.htm; MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (1962).

100.
See Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal Code] Nov. 13, 1998 BGBI. I at 945,
§ 35, 1 1 (F.R.G.) translated in 28 THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES
(Edward M.
Wise ed.,
Joseph J.
Darby trans.,
1987),
available at
http://wings.buffalo.edu/lawlbclc/germind.htm (excluding application of the duress
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MPC jurisdiction, for a threat of harm to her dog is, as a matter of
law, not sufficient coercion to warrant an exemption from criminal
responsibility.
The best way to explain this limitation on the scope of the
defense is to understand that the exculpation afforded to those who
act under duress is the product of a societal determination that the
choice to commit a crime in order to avoid harm to an actor's interests
or the interests of her loved ones is sufficiently comprehensible to
warrant an exemption from punishment, while the choice to commit a
crime to avert harm to a dog (or other highly valued property) is not.
Thus, as the German scholar Claus Roxin has asserted:
The truth is that the [limitations set forth in § 35 of the Penal Code]
[are] explained by the fact that only in [the cases that fall within the
scope of the text of the provision] does the wrongful act performed
[under duress] find sufficient understanding amongst [the public]
101
that the [exculpation] seems defensible.

Therefore, according to this conception of duress, which this
Article calls the "understandable choice" theory, the gist of the
defense lies in the "understandable" or "comprehensible" nature of
the choice made by the coerced actor and not in the "psychological
pressure" or "unfair choice" created by the threat. 10 2 Of course, there
are situations in which the emotional pressure produced by the threat
or the unfair choice should be taken into account when deciding
whether the actor should escape punishment because his decision to
However, the
engage in harmful conduct is understandable.
existence of one or both of these circumstances-emotional pressure
or a hard choice--does not conclusively establish that the actor
should be absolved from responsibility for engaging in the wrongful
act. Furthermore, the absence of either of these factors does not
necessarily make the defense fail. Thus, one might reasonably
conclude that the extreme pressure suffered by the actor and the
unfair choice that the actor faced do not generate sufficient
"understanding amongst the public" to warrant an exemption from
punishment. This explanation describes precisely what happens in
the case of Aunt Maria.
similar
Spanish commentators have advanced
Various
conceptions of the duress defense. 10 3 Professor Varona G6mez, for
example, has stated that society usually excuses people who act

defense to harm to property); MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.09 cmt. 3
(1985) (same).
CLAus ROXIN, DERECHO PENAL PARTE GENERAL 909 (Luz6n Pefia trans., 2d
101.
ed. 2000).
102.
Id.
103.
See, e.g., BUSTOS RAMIREZ & HORMAZABAL MALARE, supra note 53; DANIEL
VARONA G6MEZ, UNA RECONSTRUCcI6N DE LA EXIMENTE DESDE UNA TEORiA DE LA
JUSTICIA (2000).
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under duress because of a shared understanding that the coerced
actor "cannot turn away from his concrete interests when he is
'
evaluating the [dilemmatic choice with which he is confronted]. 104
This, in turn, leads the person who acts under duress to "give more
weight to his own personal interests and to those of his loved ones"
than to the interests of strangers. 10 5 By exculpating coerced actors
who choose to avoid personal injury at the expense of harming others,
the state acknowledges that, even though from an objective point of
view the interests of a person who acts under duress have no more
weight than the interests of the actor's innocent victim, it is
comprehensible that citizens attach more value to their own ends
than to the ends of the strangers or of the community.' 0 6 That is,
society generally considers that the coerced actor's conduct is
wrongful, but understandable. 0 7 In a similar vein, Bustos Ramirez
and Hormaz6bal Malar~e have claimed that coerced individuals
should be excused because their decision to prefer their own interests
over those of others is socially comprehensible. 10 8 In light of the
comprehensibility of these preferences, the law should not punish
those who solve the dilemma by harming others in order to avoid
personal injury.10 9
Asking whether the coerced actor's decision to engage in the
wrongful act is understandable from a societal perspective can better
explain the seriousness of the offense thesis than asking if the actor
faced an unfairly hard choice, or whether her act was voluntary or a
product of her free will. While it is clear that a person who kills
many people in order to save herself or her loved ones faces an
unfairly hard choice and that her capacity to choose freely to resist
the threats is significantly reduced by the coercive situation, it is less
clear whether her decision to engage in such an act finds sufficient
understanding among the community to warrant an exemption from
punishment. This is particularly true when the actor's decision to
perform the wrongful act jeopardizes the continued existence of the
community, which might occur when the offense committed by the
coerced defendant is a crime against humanity.
An actor who chooses to save herself by wiping out a significant
number of members of the community is unlikely to provoke

104.
VARONA G6MEZ, supra note 103, at 122.
105.
Id.
106.
Id.
107.
Professor Larry Alexander also appears to believe that the
understandability of the actor's decision to engage in a wrongful act is an essential
feature of excuse defenses. See Larry Alexander, Self-Defense, Justification and
Excuse, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 53, 53 (1993) (stating that excuses represent
"understandable though regrettable human reaction[s]" to extreme circumstances
(emphasis added)).
108.

BUSTOS RAMiREZ & HORMAZABAL MALARtE, supra note 53.

109.

Id. at 380-81.
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sufficient feelings of understanding among the public to justify
relieving her of criminal responsibility.
Thus a society might
legitimately require heroic self-sacrifice in the face of coercion to
commit a crime against humanity. The same society, however, might
properly decline to demand such a high level of courage when the
interests at stake are not as monumental.
In view of these considerations, the understandable choice theory
improves upon its competitors' explanation of the defense of duress,
retaining the advantages of the seriousness of the offense thesis while
avoiding its problems. However, the limitations of the duress defense
in light of this theory remain unexplored. The remaining Part
considers factors that should be taken into account when determining
whether a coerced actor's conduct is understandable from a societal
viewpoint.
Ultimately, these factors determine what degree of
proportionality, if any, should exist between the harm caused and the
harm averted in order for the duress defense to be pleaded
successfully.
C. CommunitarianObligations,Proportionality,and the
UnderstandableChoice Theory of Duress

1.

Voluntarily Assumed Obligations
Proportionality Standards

of

Self-Sacrifice

and

Whether a coerced actor's decision to harm a third party in order
to avoid harm to the actor's personal interests generates sufficient
understanding among the public to warrant exempting him from
criminal liability depends in large part on whether the actor breached
his communitarian obligations when he chose to engage in the
wrongful act.' 10 It has been said that duress should be disallowed as
a defense when "the persons involved had assumed a special duty to
protect the collectivity."11'
This is most evidently the case when the
coerced actor capitulates to threats even though in the past he had
voluntarily assumed obligations of self-sacrifice that required him to
12
resist coercive threats.

110.
See Laurie L. Levenson, Change of Venue and the Role of the Criminal
Jury, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1533, 1555 n.122 (1993) (noting that "[t]he duress
defense ...entails a standard that looks to the values and politics of the affected
community.").
111.
ROXIN, supra note 101, at 914-15.
112.
FRANcisco Muiioz CONDE, TEORiA GENERAL DEL DELITO 174 (3d ed. 2004)
(stating that the duress defense should be disallowed when the defendant had assumed
the obligation to sacrifice his interests for the well-being of the community).
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Cases involving law enforcement agents, firefighters, soldiers,
11 3
and seamen are paradigmatic examples of this type of situation.
To determine, for example, whether to excuse a police officer who was
coerced into harming an innocent third party in order to avoid harm
to herself, one should consider not only what a person of reasonable
firmness would have done in her situation, but also what duties police
officers typically owe to innocent third parties. When evaluating the
coerced police officer's claim of duress, the decisive consideration
seems to be that the police officer had a duty to resist threats to her
own life in order to keep innocent third parties out of harm's way. It
is reasonable to conclude that, in light of this voluntarily assumed
duty of self-sacrifice, a police officer who fails to protect innocent
people because she yields to coercion will not generate sufficient
understanding among the community to gain an exemption from
punishment. Thus, as one leading German criminal law theorist has
aptly pointed out,
The [duty] to control the instinct of self-preservation is ...required of
those who have assumed the obligation to tolerate [threats] in light of
their profession, even when the threats endanger their lives. [The
reason for this is that] it is in precisely these circumstances when the
1 14
community should be able to rely on them.

Accordingly, whether a coerced actor voluntarily assumed duties
of self-sacrifice should have a profound effect on the proportionality
that society is willing to require in order for the actor to successfully
plead duress. While a claim of duress might succeed even when the
harm caused by the defendant is greater than the harm averted, this
is surely not the case when the actor had voluntarily assumed a duty
of self-sacrifice that required her not to yield to the coercion giving
rise to the defense. In the latter cases it seems proper to deny the
actor's duress claim unless the harm averted by submitting to the
threat is significantly greater than the one caused by complying with
the coercer's demands.1 1 5 Thus, a police officer should not be
exempted from liability if, to avoid a threat of grave bodily harm, she
yields to a demand that she kill an innocent person; however, the
police officer could be relieved of responsibility if, to avoid the same
threat, she yields to a demand that she steal property.
The average person would have a sound duress claim in both
cases. However, because police officers have voluntarily assumed
duties of self-sacrifice that require them to "control their instinct of

113.
GUNTHER JAKOBS, DERECHO PENAL PARTE GENERAL 694 (Cuelo Contreras
& Rodriguez de Murillo trans., 1995).
114.
HANS HEINRICH JESCHECK & THOMAS WEIGEND, TRATADO DE DERECHO
PENAL 523 (Miguel Olmedo Cardenete trans., 5th ed. 2002).
115.
Id. at 523-24.
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preservation" more than the average person, they would only have a
116
valid duress defense in the latter case.
2.

Involuntarily Assumed Obligations That Require Self-Sacrifice
and More Stringent Proportionality Standards

Although most duties of self-sacrifice are voluntarily assumed,
there are some instances in which such duties are imposed
This is most evident in the case of familial
involuntarily.
relationships, such as relationships between parent and child. 117 For
example, the parent-child relationship requires that a father refuse to
capitulate to a threat that he will be killed unless he murders his
small child. 1 8 This involuntarily imposed obligation surely affects
the parent's ability to plead duress successfully as a defense to a
crime involving harm to his child. It seems unlikely that a father's,
decision to save his own life at the expense of his child's life will
generate sufficient understanding among the community to justify
relieving him of criminal responsibility.
The existence of such communitarian duties of self-sacrifice, both
voluntarily assumed and involuntarily imposed, invites an
examination of the proportionality that should be required in order
for a parent to successfully plead duress as a defense to a crime
involving harm to his child. Because of the parent-child relationship,
it seems fair to require that the parent endure greater harm before
yielding to the coercion than would be required from a person
unrelated to the child. 119 Hence, a father should only be able to plead
duress as an excuse to harming his child if the harm avoided by
yielding to the coercion was significantly greater than the one caused
to the child by capitulating to the threats. 120 This represents an
inversion of the proportionality analysis that is undertaken in the
typical duress case that does not involve communitarian duties of
12 1
self-sacrifice.
also arise in
of self-sacrifice
Involuntary obligations
circumstances in which the only way for a coerced actor to protect her
interests is by causing a harm that is grossly disproportionate to the
threatened harm. Consequently, a coerced actor has a duty to suffer
moderate physical injury if the only way of avoiding that injury is by

116.
Id. at 523.
117.
ROXIN, supranote 101, at 920.
118. Id.
119. See David Schmidtz, Islands in a Sea of Obligation:Limits of the Duty to
Rescue, 19 LAW & PHIL. 683, 699 (2000) (noting that "it is relatively easy to argue that
people have positive obligations to children, especially their own children.").
120. Id.
121.
Involuntary duties of self-sacrifice arising out of familial relationships may
extend to case other than those involving a parent and his child. Thus, for example, a
husband may have similar obligations towards his wife. ROXIN, supra note 101.
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killing an innocent third party. 122 Similarly, a defendant should not
be able to excuse the killing of hundreds or thousands of people by
pleading that she would have been killed if she had acted differently.
The reason for this is that society requires citizens to assume
minimum obligations of solidarity toward their fellow citizens in
order to make life in community possible. 123 Thus, notwithstanding
the unfairly hard choice faced by the defendant and the substantial
reduction of choice-making capabilities that the coercive situation
produces, a person who decides to inflict a grossly disproportionate
harm to the one averted probably will not find sufficient
understanding among the community to warrant an exemption from
124
punishment.
3.

Communitarian Family Obligations and Laxer Standards of
Proportionality

The drafters of the MPC concluded that a coerced actor may be
excused from liability for greater harm caused when attempting to
save a loved one than when trying to save himself. 125 This position is
grounded in the fact that "danger to a loved one may have greater
impact on a person of reasonable firmness than a danger to
himself. 12 6 While this might be true, the stronger argument in favor
of this contention seems to be that there are communitarian duties
stemming from familial relationships that allow for coerced actors to
inflict more harm than would be allowed absent such a
relationship. 1 27 Once again, this can be more clearly grasped in cases
involving a parent-child relationship.
While people have an
obligation to do everything in their power to keep their children free
from harm, they do not have a similar obligation to keep themselves
out of harm's way. 128 As a result of this, it seems reasonable to allow
a coerced actor to inflict more harm when the lives of his children are
at stake than when his own life is threatened.

122.
Id.
123.
See, e.g., Robin West, Rights, Capabilities, and the Good Society, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 1901, 1912 (2001) (arguing that "a state obligation to provide for
minimal capabilities requisite to a fully human life" requires "some degree of
communal solidarity among citizens" and an "obligation toward ... co-citizens").
124.
Cf. DUBBER, supra note 12, at 254 ("Even in extreme emergencies, facing
almost certain death, the Code thus allows a defense only if the actor balanced the
potential harms of action and inaction, to herself and others, and then chooses the less
harmful course of action (or inaction).").
125.

MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (1962).

126.
MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.09 cmt. 3 (1985).
127.
See Schmidtz, supra note 119, at 699 (noting the strength of the duties of
parents toward their own children).
128.
Id.
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In these cases the coerced actor's decision to harm a third party
in order to save his child is understandable both because of the
difficult nature of the choice and because saving the child's life fulfills
the parent's communitarian duty to protect his family. In contrast,
when a coerced defendant chooses to harm an innocent person merely
to safeguard her personal interests, the understandability of the
decision will not be bolstered by a finding that the actor satisfied her
family obligations by choosing to harm the third party. This should
lead to a modification of the standard of proportionality that typically
more
of the duress defense:
conditions the availability
disproportionality between the harm caused and the harm averted
will be allowed in cases in which an actor yields to coercion in order to
save her loved ones than in cases that do not involve such interests.
4.

Understandability and the Capacity to Prevent the Harm
Threatened from Occurring

Another important consideration to take into account when
deciding whether to exempt a coerced actor from penal liability is
whether he could have avoided harming his victims by choosing to
resist the threats. This factor appeared to be determinative for Judge
Cassese in Erdemovic; in his dissenting opinion, he argued that a
coerced actor who kills innocent human beings should be relieved of
criminal responsibility if "it is highly probable, if not certain, that if
the person acting under duress had refused to commit the crime, the
crime would in any event have been carried out by persons other than
'12 9
the accused.
Judge Cassese's position assumes that, in these instances,
deciding to kill the innocent people constitutes the lesser evil because
"the evil threatened (the menace to [the life of the coerced actor] and
his subsequent death) would be greater than the remedy (his
refraining from committing the crime, i.e., from participating in the
execution). ' 130 Therefore, he suggests that this type of case invites a
variation of the justification commonly known as the "choice of evils"
131
defense.
An example in Judge Cassese's dissent illustrates this lesser evil
argument. 132 Suppose that "a driver of a van.., transporting victims
to a place of execution . . .is told by the executioners he must shoot

129.
Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dissenting
Opinion of Judge Cassese, 44 (Oct. 7, 1997).
Id.
130.
Id.; see MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1962) (providing a description of the
131.
"choice of evils" defense).
Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dissenting
132.
Opinion of Judge Cassese, 47 (Oct. 7, 1997).
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one of the victims or he himself will be shot. '133 Assuming that "[t]he
victims who are at the execution site will certainly die in any
event,"134 shooting the innocent victim would constitute the lesser
evil because:
(1)

If the driver resists the threats, he will be killed. Shortly
thereafter, the innocent person that he was ordered to kill will
die anyway. Thus, two people will die if the driver resists the
threat;

(2)

If the driver yields to the threat, his life will be spared, but an
Thus, one person will die if he
innocent victim will die.
capitulates to the threat.

(3)

Two people will die if the driver resists the threats, and one will
die if he gives way to the coercion. Therefore, the decision to
succumb to the threat and kill the innocent victim would
constitute the lesser evil.

Based on this logic, Judge Cassese concludes that, even though "the
crime committed under duress must be, on balance, the lesser of two
evils,"'1 35 someone who is coerced into "participating in the killing
of... civilians who would be killed in any case by the other[sl" has a
13 6
valid duress defense.
Judge Cassese's contention is objectionable because it
presupposes an oversimplified calculus of what constitutes the lesser
evil. In addition to comparing the number of people that would have
been killed had the coerced actor resisted the threats with the
amount of people that would have been killed had the actor yielded to
the coercion, one should also take into consideration that, by giving
way to the threats, the actor is aiding someone else in the commission
of a wrongful and heinous act. This collaboration in the perpetration
of a crime is, in and of itself, an evil that should weigh against
yielding to the threats. Thus, as the philosopher Frances Kamm has
suggested, these types of decisions are "not merely a matter of
weighing the lives saved versus the life lost," for the agent's moral
integrity is compromised by his forced involvement in the production
13 7
of evil.
Similarly, Professor Robinson has stated that "the harm to the
social order inherent in unjustified aggression" should be taken into

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
172 (1999).

Id.
Id.

Id. I 16(iii).
Id. 50(iii).
F.M. Kamm, Responsibility and Collaboration, 28 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 169,
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Scholars in continental legal
account when balancing evils. 138
traditions also argue that the evil inherent in human collaboration
with wrongful conduct is a relevant consideration in deciding which
conduct constitutes the lesser evil. 139 One Spanish criminal law
scholar has asserted that when balancing evils one must keep in
mind that
[t]he law compares "evils", not "personal interests". [This is crucial],
since the gravity of an "evil" is not only determined by the value of the
"personal interest" harmed, but by the way in which it is harmed as
Since a harm produced by nature does not allow for an
well.
assessment of anything else besides the personal interest harmed, the
gravity of the "evil" in such a case is equal to the importance of the
injured interest. However, the "evil" caused [by the conduct of another]
entails not only the harming of a personal interest, but, additionally, a
perturbation of the social order ....

Thus, [a valid lesser evils defense

requires that the personal interest saved] be sufficiently more
important [than the one harmed] to compensate for the additional
140
[harm] that the [perturbation of the social order entails].

Therefore, it may not be true, as Judge Cassese suggests, that
killing "x" people is necessarily a lesser evil than killing "x + 1"
people. 14 1 When engaging in this delicate balancing of interests, one
must take into account not only the lives at stake but also the evil
that the coerced actor's aggression represents. 14 2 Thus, in the case of
a coerced actor who saves her own life by killing many people who
would have died soon anyway, one must weigh not only the number of
lives sacrificed and saved but also the evil inherent in the actor's
It is
collaboration with the wrongful conduct of the coercer.
nevertheless unclear whether this additional consideration tilts the
balance decisively against justifying the coerced actor's conduct
constituted as the lesser of two evils.
Fortunately, there is no need to engage in this delicate balancing
act. The fact that the coerced actor's victims would have died soon
anyway is relevant to determining whether the actor's conduct
generates sufficient understanding among the public to warrant an
Although this fact is not
exemption from criminal liability.
necessarily determinative when examining whether the actor's
conduct is justified as a choice of the lesser evil, it is decisive when
evaluating whether her action should be excused because of the
coercion.

Paul Robinson, Causing the Conditions of One's Own Defense: A Study in
138.
the Limits of Theory in Criminal Law Doctrine, 71 VA. L. REV. 1, 3 n.4 (1985).
139.
See, e.g., SANTIAGO MIR PUIG, DERECHO PENAL PARTE GENERAL (7th ed.
2004).

Id. at 463-64.
140.
141.
Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dissenting
Opinion of Judge Cassese, T 47 (Oct. 7, 1997).
142.
See Kamm, supra note 137, at 172 (noting that factors other than the
number of lives saved or lost must be taken into account).
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Thus, although a coerced actor who harms an innocent victim
may act wrongfully despite the fact that she could not have prevented
14 3
the harm, this fact provides a sound reason to excuse her conduct.
There is no need to inquire whether the harm caused was
proportional to the harm averted in order to determine whether to
excuse the coerced actor. Because the actor effectively lacked the
capacity to prevent the harm threatened from occurring, punishing
the actor for deciding to save her own life instead of dying to protect
innocent people who were going to die anyway would be unfair. In
sum, yielding to the coercive threats in this case is wrongful but
perfectly understandable and, hence, not punishable.

V. APPLYING THE UNDERSTANDABLE CHOICE THEORY TO THE
ERDEMOVIC CASE

Analyzing the Erdemovic case in light of the understandable
choice theory of duress is no easy task. As this Article has
demonstrated in the preceding Parts, whether the defendant faced an
unfairly hard choice and whether his choice-making capabilities were
reduced by the coercive situation are relevant factors, but neither is
144
decisive according to the understandable choice theory of duress.
While actors who face unfairly hard choices or whose will is overcome
by threats generally find sufficient understanding among the
community to warrant an exception from liability, in some cases they
145
will nevertheless be held responsible.
Coerced actors will typically be punished for yielding to threats
that presented them with unfairly hard choices if they had a duty not
to capitulate to such coercion. 146 These duties can be voluntarily
assumed, as in the case of firefighters and police officers. 147 However,
they can also be involuntarily imposed, as in the case of obligations
arising out of familial relationships. 148 Furthermore, people have a
general obligation based on their relationships with fellow citizens to
resist threats to which yielding would produce harm that is grossly
149
disproportionate to the harm averted.
Several of these principles suggest that the ICTY was correct to
conclude that Erdemovic should not have been able to claim duress as

143.
Professor Kent Greenawalt, for example, has stated that the argument that
coerced conduct that causes harm to an innocent human being should be excused but
not justified "has some power." Greenawalt, supra note 49, at 25.
144.
See supra Part IV.A.
145.
See supraPart IV.B.
146.
See supraPart IV.C.
147.
See supra Part IV.C.1.
148.
See supraPart IV.C.2.
149.
See supra Part IV.C.3.
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a defense to the killing of dozens of civilians. Chief among the
relevant considerations is that, as a soldier, Erdemovic had an
obligation to protect innocent noncombatants. 150 In the standard
case, a soldier is required to resist threats to his own life and bodily
integrity in order to protect innocent people. 151 While the law should
not generally demand that most people resist threats to their lives in
order to avoid harm to third parties, it is perfectly legitimate to
require such a degree of courage from people who, like soldiers, have
assumed certain duties towards to the general populace.
The seriousness of the offense thesis also supports convicting
Erdemovic. Even though claiming duress as a defense to a single
murder is not particularly problematic, allowing it as a defense to a
crime involving the killing of dozens of people is more complicated.
While it is not difficult to see how a coerced actor who kills one
innocent person in order to avoid death can generate sufficient
understanding from the community to be exempted from punishment,
it is more doubtful that someone who kills a number of people can
expect the same degree of comprehension from the public.
These factors are trumped, however, by the fact that Erdemovic
did not have the capacity to prevent the deaths of the innocent
civilians that he killed in order to save his life. 152 Any resistance on
his part would ultimately have been futile, because the civilians
would have died at the hands of other soldiers. 153 As a result of these
considerations, punishing Erdemovic for not symbolically resisting
the coercion is unnecessarily harsh.
However, contrary to Judge Cassese's argument in his dissenting
opinion, 154 this reasoning does not make Erdemovic's decision to kill
the innocent civilians any less wrongful. The conclusion that the
defendant chose the lesser evil when he participated in the execution
of nearly seventy innocent people is dubious at the very least.
Nevertheless, had the justices considered the fact that Erdemovic
could not have saved his victims by refusing to capitulate to the
threats, they should have found that fact a compelling and sufficient
reason to excuse his wrongful conduct.

150.
See Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion
of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah,
84 (Oct. 7, 1997) (noting the "view that
soldiers or combatants are expected to exercise fortitude and a greater degree of
resistance to a threat than civilians").
151.
Id.
152.
See Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Judgment on Appeal,
4 (Oct. 7, 1997) (containing defendant's testimony that he himself would have been
killed had he not shot the victims in question).
153.
Id.
154.
Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dissenting
Opinion of Judge Cassese, 50 (Oct. 7, 1997).
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VI. CONCLUSION

A majority of the justices in the Erdemovic case believed that
duress should not be a defense to a crime against humanity. They
justified their decision by appealing to the common law rule that
disallows the defense whenever a defendant is charged with a crime
involving the killing of innocent human beings. This rule is based on
the idea that killing an innocent human being should never be
considered the lesser of two evils.
As this Article has argued, the justices' application of the
common law rule is unsound. Properly understood, duress is an
excuse. Therefore, actors who commit crimes under duress are
acquitted out of compassion for their circumstances. Their conduct,
however, remains wrongful. Hence, when a coerced defendant is
excused it is because, in light of the circumstances surrounding his
action, his choice to engage in wrongdoing is understandable-not
because he chose the lesser evil. Consequently, a rule allowing an
actor to plead duress only when his conduct averted a greater evil
improperly conditions the availability of the excuse on the existence
of justificatory circumstances-circumstances that make the act
performed, on balance, the right thing to do under the circumstances.
Therefore, the legal community should reject the common law rule
that duress is not a defense to murder because the killing of an
innocent human being cannot ever be considered the right thing to
do.
The situation is different, however, when the coerced actor
pleads duress as a defense to a crime involving the killing of
numerous human beings. As the seriousness of the offense increases,
the arguments in favor of allowing the defendant to plead duress get
progressively weaker. Thus, the fact that the coerced defendant in
Erdemovic killed dozens of people suggests that he should not be
allowed to plead duress as a defense to the crime charged. Another
sound reason to deny his duress claim is that soldiers have a duty not
to kill innocent civilians, even if refusing to kill civilians requires the
soldiers to ignore threats to their lives.
Ultimately, despite the above-mentioned considerations,
Erdemovic should have prevailed on a plea of duress. Because he
could not have prevented the deaths of his victims even if he had
resisted coercion, it is unfair to punish him for choosing to yield to the
coercion in order to save his own life. Hence, although the fact that
he lacked the capacity to prevent the death of the civilians should not
be considered a sufficient reason to justify his conduct, it offers
compelling grounds for excusing his admittedly wrongful act.

